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I. INTRODUCTION: PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 
When historians in the far distant future look back upon the tumultuous twentieth 
century, they will likely judge the most outstanding feature to be the extraordinary 
increase in human numbers that has occurred during this relatively short time 
period.  It took the entire history of humanity – tens of thousands of years – for the 
world’s population to reach one billion, which is now estimated to have occurred 
around 1804. It was more than a century later that the second billion was reached. 
But it took only 12 years – from 1987 to 1999 --. for the most recent billion, the 
sixth, to be added. The world has never seen anything like the steep population 
growth of the twentieth century, with most of it concentrated during the last fifty 
years. 
 
That human populations can exert strains upon their natural surrounding is nothing 
new. However, from the dawn of history until about thirty years ago, the impacts of 
human activities were primarily localized. Early regional civilizations – 
Mesopotamia in the Near East, Mohenjo Daro in Southwest Asia, the Mayans of 
Central America, possibly the Anasazi in the southwest of what is now the United 
States – collapsed due to a likely combination of overpopulation and scarcity or 
depletion of arable land and water supply. In some places, archaeologists have 
found evidence of adverse environmental effects caused by deforestation and by 
gradual salinization of irrigated land. The final blow may have been a regional 
climate change: a succession of unusual dry years, probably ascribed by local 
spiritual leaders to angry or capricious gods.  Many centuries before the Aswan 
High Dam, Herodotus wrote of salinization in the Nile Delta. Much later, rapid 
industrialization in Europe and North America was accompanied by severe local 
pollution of air and water. 
 
Environmental stress has thus been a continuing factor throughout human history. It 
is fair to say, however, that at the close of the twentieth century the 6 billion 
inhabitants of planet Earth find themselves threatened by environmental dangers 
that would have been unimaginable to our 1.65 billion forefathers at the beginning 
of the century. The industrial, agricultural, and energy policies that produced 
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enormous improvements in standards of living during the last half-century are now 
beginning to have profound environmental impacts that can adversely affect the 
interactive natural planetary cycles upon which all life depends. For the first time, 
we confront a new generation of environmental problems that are global in nature: 
 
Changing climate, that could bring both drought and flooding, altered rainfall 
patterns and loss of agricultural land, sea-level rise, severe storms, and spread 
of disease. 
Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer that protects humans, plants, and 
animals from potentially fatal ultraviolet radiation. 
Loss of biological diversity: mass extinctions of animal and plant species that 
represent an irreplaceable genetic library. 
Spread of arid lands, desertification, and soil erosion on a global scale, 
affecting the livelihood of hundreds of millions of already poor people. 
Pollution of marine and fresh waters that combines with overfishing to imperil a 
vital food source. 
Destruction of forests at a rate never experienced in the history of the planet. 
Worldwide diffusion of hazardous substances, including the persistent organic 
pollutants that may, even in minute quantities and over long time periods, 
adversely affect the metabolism of humans and animals. 
 
These new environmental issues are not the premonitions of modern Cassandras. 
They are to a significant extent already upon us, measured and tracked by 
scientists (cf. UNEP 1999, Simonis et al. 1996). And this comes in an era when 
human numbers are moving rapidly upward into uncharted territory. 
 
All of these global environmental trends are, in some ways, touched by 
demographic dynamics: population size, population growth rates, population 
densities, migration of peoples. Some environmental problems are influenced 
more directly by population, some less -- even acknowledging that there are such 
mediating factors as income levels, consumption patterns, technological structure, 
and economic and political institutions. 
 
Because of these intervening parameters, it is often difficult to establish with 
scientific precision clear correlations between population pressures and 
environmental degradation. Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree with the conclusion 
of a recent study that “the least likely theory is that there are no relationships at all.” 
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(O’Neill et al., 1998, emphasis added)  
 
Many scientists are beginning to express concern about the extent of the planet’s 
capacity, as reflected in the functioning of its natural cycles and ecosystems, to 
support the unprecedented numbers of people and their growing demands. 
(Cohen 1995, Watson et al. 1998) Can enough food and energy be provided – not 
to mention jobs, education, health care, waste disposal – to accommodate these 
billions without causing some irreversible ecological collapse that could imperil the 
whole human experiment?  
 
As one example, the fragile layer of ozone molecules scattered throughout the 
stratosphere is vital to the survival of life on Earth. The example of Antarctica offers 
us a sobering lesson: the sudden and totally unexpected depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer over the southern continent (the so-called “ozone hole”) 
demonstrates that when the atmosphere is perturbed, nature may not provide 
convenient early warning signals to moderate our activities in time. 
 
About 25 years ago, the cumulating effects of man-made chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) -- an “ideal” chemical whose usefulness in thousands of products and 
processes made it almost synonymous with modern standards of living -- began 
slowly to lift the quantity of chlorine in the atmosphere from its natural level of 0.6 
parts per billion (ppb). Concentrations increased gradually, to 0.9, 1.4, then 1.9 
ppb – yet the ozone layer remained unaffected. Only when chlorine concentrations 
passed the minute but unforeseen threshold of 2 parts per billion did the ozone 
layer over Antarctica suddenly collapse, to the surprise and alarm of the scientific 
community. Notwithstanding the successful global controls imposed by the 1987 
Montreal Protocol and its subsequent revisions, the long atmospheric lifetime of 
CFCs means that it will take about 70 years for the ozone layer worldwide to 
recover to natural levels. (Benedick 1998) By their very nature, the risks of other 
environmental thresholds are not quantifiable. But they are not zero. 
 
In this article, I would like to explore population-environment interlinkages in three 
representative areas: forests, fresh water, and climate change. Following this, we 
will examine the most recent comprehensive effort by the international „community 
to address population issues, as manifested in the twenty-year Cairo Programme 
of Action“ negotiated at the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD). But before doing so, let us look more closely in the following 
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section at some dimensions of the population nexus. 
II. THE POPULATION CENTURY 
Some time during October 1999 the world’s population passed 6 billion souls. 
Since the middle of the century, when there had been 2.5 billion people, the 
number of human beings on planet Earth had grown by an additional 3.5 billion. 
Within the previous two decades alone, the increase was equivalent to the entire 
population of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Never in human 
history have populations grown so rapidly and in such dimensions. (Demographic 
data throughout this article come from: United Nations Population Division 1999 
and, for urban data, ibid. 1998) 
 
To be sure, the annual growth rate peaked at 2.0 percent in 1965-70, and the 
annual increments reached a height of about 90 million in 1985-90.  Global 
population growth is currently estimated at 1.3 percent, representing an annual 
addition of just under 80 million. 
 
Using sophisticated demographic tools and assumptions about the continuing rate 
of fertility decline, the United Nations currently estimates that in fifty more years, by 
2050, the world’s population will probably lie within a range of 7.3 billion (low 
variant) to 10.7 billion (high variant), with the 8.9 billion medium variant considered 
as “most likely.” The difference between the low and high variants depends largely 
on the degree to which families in developing countries freely decide to reduce 
their number of children.  
 
Looking only thirty years into the future, the ranges are closer, and the estimates 
more accurate, because tomorrow’s parents have already been born. The low 
variant is 7.4 billion, the high variant 8.8. billion. (Note that under the low variant 
assumptions, population is peaking and will begin a slow decline to eventual 
stabilization around 7 billion.) The most likely global population in 2030 is 8.1 
billion – over 2 billion more people than at present. 
There are three aspects of these demographic developments that I would like to 
highlight because of their relevance to the natural environment. 
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First, population growth has been, and will continue to be, strongly skewed. Over 
90 percent of the population increase during the last half century occurred in the 
poorer regions of the world. The pace accelerated to 97 percent in the 1990s, and 
for the coming fifty years, it will be virtually 100 percent. Just the additions to 
India’s population in the last five years -- 80 million people – was equivalent to the 
total population of Germany. 
 
This phenomenon has brought about a significant redistribution of the Earth’s 
population. Between 1950 and 2000, the populations in developing regions grew 
by well over 3 billion (which was equivalent to total world population in 1960). 
Whereas in 1950 the industrialized countries accounted for about one-third of the 
total, their proportion dropped below 20 percent by century’s end. According to the 
most likely UN estimate, by 2050 the developing nations will comprise 87 percent 
of global population.  Most of these countries already face problems of health and 
deteriorating environment, with large numbers living in ecologically fragile areas 
(e.g., drylands, hillsides, savannas, low-lying deltas), and now confronting 
combined environmental impacts brought about by both poverty and by the early 
stages of industrialization. 
 
Within the developing world itself there are also significant differences in growth 
patterns. While Asia’s growth rates are slowing, it was and will remain the largest 
region in numbers, with about 60 percent of global population. The fastest growing 
– and poorest – region is Africa, with its proportion projected to grow from less 
than 9 percent in 1950 to nearly 20 percent of the much larger world total in 2050. 
In 1950, there were less than half as many Africans as Europeans; now, despite 
the AIDS epidemic, there are nearly three times as many. Most industrialized 
countries currently have stable, or even declining, populations, the main 
exceptions being the United States and Canada because of immigration.  
 
A surprising note on aging: while there has been much written about the increase 
in numbers of older people in the industrialized world, looking ahead the prospect 
is quite different. Currently, the over-60 population in the South amounts to about 
170 million, or only 43 percent of this age category worldwide. However, during the 
next fifty years the number is projected to surge more than nine-fold, to 1.6 billion, 
which will then comprise 80 percent of the world’s total elderly. For industrialized 
countries, the expected growth is from 226 million in 2000 to 376 million in 2050.  
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A second outstanding demographic development of our era is the accelerated 
concentration of populations in urban areas. In 1950, just over one third of the 
world’s population were city dwellers, a total of 860 million. By the close of the 
century, this number had grown to just under 3 billion, 48 percent of total 
population. But in just the coming fifteen years, it is expected that 4 billion people 
will live in cities – 55 percent of global population.  
 
Again, most of this growth in urbanization will occur in the South, with masses 
fleeing rural poverty brought about by scarcity of arable land and water, growing 
land degradation and aridity. By 2015, nearly 3 billion city dwellers in the poorer 
countries will constitute three-fourths of the world’s urban population. Perhaps the 
most striking aspect of the urbanization trend is the rise of “megacities,” 
agglomerations of over ten million – a phenomenon new to the planet. In 1950, 
there was only one, New York City. By 2015, it is anticipated that there will be 26, 
of which 22 will be in the South. It is difficult to conceive of Lagos holding nearly 25 
million inhabitants, or Dhaka with over 19 million. 
 
Such urban concentrations have significant environmental implications. In many 
cases, cities will encroach on farmland or ecologically sensitive wetlands or 
watersheds. Increased overcrowding will bring greater health problems and higher 
vulnerability to epidemics and natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcano 
eruptions, storms and flooding. Issues of waste disposal – air and water pollution 
and solid wastes – will assume gigantic proportions.  It is also worth mentioning 
that city dwellers consume more energy and natural resources per capita than their 
country cousins. 
 
The third and final dimension of the population picture that I would like to 
emphasize is the phenomenon of demographic momentum. In developing nations 
an unusually large proportion of the population is under 15 years of age – in 
dozens of countries they exceed 40 percent of the total. This means that even if 
future families have fewer children, there is a continuing growth factor because the 
number of people that are entering into their reproductive years (new parents) is 
greater than the number that are leaving. Thus, populations continue to grow 
significantly for many decades even after fertility rates begin to decline: there is a 
built-in growth momentum. 
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The current total fertility rate (TFR, or average number of children per female) in 
most of Africa and the Middle East is well over 5, which, combined with high 
proportions of young people, explains the continuing rapid population growth 
projected for these areas. In contrast, some developing countries with slow growth 
now have reached TFRs of under three (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia), or even 
less than two (e.g., China, Thailand). However, as long as TFR exceeds 2.1 (one 
girl child per woman, with allowance for some deaths before the girl children 
themselves reach reproductive age), a nation’s population will continue to grow. 
(United Nations 1999:70-72) 
 
Because of the factor of demographic momentum, for most developing countries 
the greatest increase in numbers actually lies ahead, not in the past.  The following 
figures are based on the current UN medium variant (“most likely”) estimates 
published in 1999. Only if the fertility decline is steeper than is considered most 
probable based on recent experience, or if mortality rates and/or emigration are 
higher than expected, will the numbers for 2050 turn out to be below the current 
medium variant estimate. 
 
Here are a few representative examples (see Table 1). With the exceptions of 
China, India and Indonesia (which are shown here because of their size), in all of 
these countries (and in many more) the greatest growth in numbers will probably 
occur in the coming fifty years. This is so despite the fact that they have all 
witnessed a doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling of their numbers within the 
previous fifty years. By way of comparison, by 2050 the number of Afghans (and 
Sudanese, and Yemenis) will each exceed the number of Frenchmen; there will be 
more Tanzanians than Germans. 
 
In other words, the largest increases are still to come. Most of these countries are 
already in political and/or ecologically precarious situations. Yet political leaders, 
North and South, do not act as if they are aware of what lies ahead 
demographically. Against this background, let us now examine three specific 
environmental issues in terms of their relationship to population dynamics. 
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Table 1: Population in millions, actual and estimated 
 1950 2000 2050 
    
Trouble Spots 
   
Afghanistan   9     23     61 
Angola   4     13     37 
Dem. Rep. Congo 12     52   160 
Iraq   5     20     55 
Water scarce    
Ethiopia 18     63   169 
Saudi Arabia   3     22     54 
Sudan   9     29     59 
Yemen   4     18     59 
Tropical    
Colombia   13     42     72 
Guatemala   3     11     27 
Philippines   21     76   131 
Tanzania     8     34     81 
Giants    
China 555 1278 1478 
India 368 1014 1529 
Indonesia   80   212   312 
Nigeria   31   112   244 
Pakistan   40   156   345 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division 1999. 
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III. DWINDLING FORESTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
The forests of our planet have been basic to the development of human civilization. 
They are a resource that is unique in its combination of multifaceted utility and 
easy renewability, through planting. Wood products are a major element in the 
global economy, fundamental for human settlements in housing, furnishings, fuel, 
paper and packaging, and for such non-wood products as berries, nuts, and 
medicinal herbs; e.g., nine of the ten most-prescribed pharmaceuticals in the 
United States are derived from forest plants and animals. Even though wood has 
been replaced for many traditional uses by coal, oil, steel, and plastics, wood and 
wood products still rank third in value among the world’s commodities, trailing only 
oil and natural gas. (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1999:18-19) 
 
Complementing their direct economic benefits are the irreplaceable ecological 
functions of the world’s forests. Forests are essential for biological diversity: 
tropical forests alone shelter at least half of the world’s known species.( 
op.cit.:22)Through the evapotranspiration cycle between soils, trees, and 
atmosphere, forests are a major determinate of local climate and their diminution 
could bring on drought; an estimated 75 to 95 percent of rainfall in the Congo 
River basin is recycled through forests.(op.cit.:19) Forests protect and enrich soils 
and watersheds, providing erosion control against landslides and flooding, and 
enhancing the quality and regulating the quantity of water. As a major sink for 
carbon dioxide, the world’s forests help to offset anthropogenic emissions from 
burning fossil fuel and thereby mitigate potential climate change. Not to be ignored 
are the recreational, esthetic and spiritual aspects of forests. 
 
More forests have been cleared since 1850 than in all of previous history, and the 
rate of destruction has been highest in recent decades. Although forest cover in 
the industrialized world is now expanding, this has been more than offset by 
destruction of forests in the developing nations. Asia and Africa, regions with the 
greatest population growth, have lost an estimated 65 to 70 percent of their 
original forest cover. (op.cit.:25-27) 
 
 
Global wood consumption has tripled during the twentieth century – roughly 
paralleling growth in human numbers.  But interestingly, forest loss is not a 
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problem caused primarily by profligate consumers in the North.  Industrialized 
countries, largely in managed forests with reforestation programs, produce 75 
percent of total industrial hardwood, while tropical forests account for only 15 
percent; the North produces 80 percent of the world’s wood used for paper and 
pulp. In contrast, developing countries produce 90 percent of wood used for 
household consumption as fuel and charcoal. 
 
In the ten developing nations that lost the most forest in the period 1990-1995, all 
but two consumed over 90 percent of their output domestically, including Brazil, 
Congo, Indonesia, Mexico, Sudan and Thailand. Rising demand for wood, 
especially for fuel, in Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Viet Nam, poses increasing dangers to the viability of their forests. 
(op.cit.:9,34-37)  
 
Because of the complexities involved in human use of forests, it has been difficult 
to provide definitive proof of the link between population growth and forest 
destruction. Nevertheless, a recent study of 111 countries by an international 
research consortium concluded that approximately half of the deforestation over 
the course of human history could be explained by changes in population. The 
World Bank has noted that Central Africa during the 1980s experienced the 
world’s second highest rate of deforestation while having the lowest per capita 
income and the highest population growth rate. Haiti, the most  severely 
deforested nation in Central America, is also the poorest and most densely 
populated. In South Asia, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization warned that 
conservation efforts “will be nullified and in places reversed, unless ... 
accompanied by a reduction in the rate of growth of population.” (op.cit.:32-33,56) 
 
Many analysts are convinced that the greatest future threat to forests stems from 
the imperative to provide food for the immense numbers of people on the horizon. 
Judging from the recent half-century, there will be pressures to clear more forests 
to provide land for crops and/or livestock. When dams are constructed to furnish 
water for irrigation, forests are often flooded and farmers are displaced to 
highlands, where the destruction cycle continues in order to make room for their 
planting. Forests have also fallen victim to government resettlement programs in 
response to local population pressures, e.g., in Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines. 
Poverty and inequitable land tenure force landless workers to seek a livelihood by 
clearing forest lands. 
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It has been estimated that by 1995, 1.7 billion people in 40 countries already were, 
because of inadequate forest cover, vulnerable to shortages of fuel wood and to 
growing impacts of flooding and erosion. In just 30 years, by 2025, this number is 
projected to rise to 4.6 billion people in 53 countries. In many areas, including 
Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan, it is anticipated that severe forest loss will combine 
with increased water scarcity over this period to compound the threats to the 
wellbeing of hundreds of millions of people. (op.cit.:9,49-51) 
With this background, let us turn to the question of water. 
IV. GROWING WATER SCARCITY 
Water gives an illusion of abundance since it covers about two thirds of our 
planet’s surface. The reality, however, is that only 2½ percent consists of the fresh 
water needed by human beings. Of this fraction, 69 percent is locked into 
permanent snow cover or glaciers.  A further 30 percent consists of fresh 
groundwater, much of which is inaccessible, unusable, or only obtained at great 
expense of energy. Only three-tenths of one percent of total fresh water can be truly 
considered as renewable: the water from rainfall, seeping into the soils to nourish 
plant and tree growth and replenish underground aquifers, collecting in rivers and 
lakes, flowing into the oceans, and evaporating into the atmosphere in a natural 
hydrological cycle that will produce more rain.  (Shiklomanov 1993) 
 
Humanity uses fresh water for drinking and hygiene, for carrying away wastes 
(e.g., from urban areas), for industrial purposes – but most of all, more than two 
thirds, for irrigating land to satisfy the world’s growing demand for food. In the past 
half-century there has been a virtual explosion of large-scale irrigation projects, 
mostly concentrated in the developing world. The number of large dams (defined 
as over 15 meters in height) grew from 5,000 in 1950 to approximately 40,000 
today. (Postel 1999:81) Most of the expansion in irrigation has been concentrated 
in Asia; China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan depend on irrigated land for more 
than half of their domestic food harvest.  (op.cit.:41) 
 
Current trends are disturbing. Growth in irrigated land in recent decades has not 
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kept pace with population. The watersheds of some of the largest Asian rivers – 
Indus, Ganges, Yangtze, Yellow – have been damaged by deforestation. (Gardner-
Outlaw and Engelman 1999:21) Many of the world’s major rivers – including, in 
addition to the above-mentioned, the Nile, Colorado, Chao Phraya (Thailand), and 
Amu Darya (Central Asia), are overused to such a degree that little or none of their 
flow ever reaches the sea; indeed even the Yellow River has run dry in every year 
throughout the 1990s. (Postel 1999:65-73)  
 
Worldwide, cropland is being lost to cities, industry, erosion, flooding – and to 
salinization, the slowly cumulating curse that accompanies big irrigation schemes, 
described as “one of the gravest threats to irrigated agriculture and food security.” 
(op.cit.:109) Increasing reliance on nonrenewable groundwater is resulting in 
falling water tables being recorded on every continent, including North America. It 
is estimated that India’s water withdrawals are already twice the rate of natural 
groundwater recharging – and a half-billion more Indians are on the way. 
(op.cit.:73-80; United Nations 1999:28)  
 
Poor quality drinking water affects the health of hundreds of millions of people in 
the developing world and is a major factor in infant and child mortality. The number 
of people without access to safe drinking water has risen by the end of the 
twentieth century to over 1.2 billion, roughly one person in four in the poorer 
countries. (Watson et al. 1998) The growth in the developing world of large cities 
with over one million inhabitants – from 34 in 1950 to an estimated 400 by 2015 – 
imposes added strains on water supplies and leads to rainwater being flushed 
away rather than recharging underground aquifers by natural seepage through the 
soil. 
 
Beyond the strictly utilitarian demands on fresh water, environmentalists make a 
strong case for a holistic conception of fresh water as part of a network of 
interconnected ecological systems. Although economists cannot assign a market 
price, freshwater ecosystems perform numerous vital functions, carrying nutrients 
into the sea that sustain marine life; providing habitats and spawning grounds for a 
diversity of animal and plant species; replenishing soil fertility; diluting wastes. 
And, as with forests, the waters possess aesthetic and inspirational qualities that 
have enriched the human experience. 
 
A symbol of the conflict between ecological preservation and economic growth is 
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Okavango Delta in Botswana, the largest in the world.  The Okavango nourishes 
Africa’s biggest oasis, a watering ground for millions of animals fleeing the 
Kalahari Valley during the dry season. About 100,000 local fishers and herders 
also derive their livelihood from the Okavango. Planners advising neighboring 
Namibia proposed a system of dams and dredging to divert the river for multiple 
purposes, including irrigation, a rapidly growing metropolis, and diamond mine 
operations. An alliance of conservationists and local villagers was able to block 
the project and ecotourism has been promoted as an alternative revenue source. 
But the demands, here and elsewhere, will inevitably grow. (Gardner-Outlaw and 
Engelman 1997; Postel 1997) 
 
Looking into the new century, it should be possible to meet the growing water 
demand for personal use, for municipalities, and for industries, assuming more 
intensive conservation measures, more realistic water pricing, and some luck with 
technological innovation. However, there will be growing competition with the 
demands of agriculture, which could lead to loss of food production. 
 
The population-food-land equation is compounded as humans seek ever greater 
supplies of water -- under the UN’s most likely variant, two billion additional people 
in the next thirty years. Because of the sheer volume of water required for 
irrigation, population growth is a critical factor, translated into demand for food, 
which in turn may imply more irrigated land. It thus is quite clear that the risks are 
growing that more people will face the prospect of water scarcity and, therefore, 
food scarcity. As Sandra Postel, a leading water resource scholar recently 
observed: “Water scarcity is now the single biggest threat to food production.” 
(Postel 1999:6) 
 
The poor are particularly vulnerable. It has been noted that approximately 470 
million people in the developing world were affected by water stress or scarcity in 
1995. This number could rise more than six-fold in only thirty years, to over 3 billion 
by 2025 -- nearly 40 percent of the world’s population.  (op.cit.:128-132; Gardner-
Outlaw and Engelman 1997) People in affected countries would be subject to 
chronic shortages as not enough water would is available to satisfy all the demand 
of cities, industries, and irrigated agriculture.  
 
With water scarcity affecting harvests, poor countries will need to import ever 
greater quantities of grain. Egypt, for example, which used to be self-sufficient, 
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now depends on imports for 40 percent of its grain consumption.  If the situation 
worsens, economic and social development will be set back and serious 
environmental degradation may occur. The combination of hunger, rising prices for 
imported grain, and large urban populations has the potential to destabilize 
societies in many parts of the world. 
 
As recently as twenty to thirty years ago, shortages of water were only occasional 
scattered occurrences.  Now, the problem is becoming pervasive.  Water scarcity 
on such a large scale, affecting hundreds of millions of people, is a uniquely 
modern phenomenon. Security concerns mount as nations compete for 
increasingly scarce water to meet the needs of their people.  Many of the great 
river systems provide water to countries with rapidly rising populations, and in 
most cases the greatest numbers are, as we have seen above, still to come, e.g., 
the Tigris-Euphrates (Turkey, Syria, Iraq); the Ganges (India, Bangladesh); the Nile 
(Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt). In 1985, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at that time Foreign 
Minister of Egypt, warned that “the next war in our region will be over the waters of 
the Nile, not politics.” (Gleick 1994) 
 
Many agriculturalists believe that the future of the Green Revolution will depend on 
irrigation, since only an assured water supply will justify farmers’ large investments 
in seeds, fertilizers, and technologies to increase land productivity. But how will 
this happen? Most potential dam sites have already been exploited, at great 
social, economic and ecological cost. In any event, the long-term viability of such 
massive projects is questionable. Rising costs (including compensation for 
displaced persons), greater awareness of ecological consequences, siltation, and 
waterlogging and salinity are diminishing the returns from mammoth irrigation 
schemes. (Postel 1999:60-64)  
 
No doubt, the future will need to see different and more efficient management of 
scarce fresh water resources, combined with greater sensitivity to the 
interconnected ecological systems – water, land, and forests – that provide the 
context for civilization and well-being. The productivity of irrigation water could be 
enhanced by greater conservation and by various technical improvements.  
Measures could include drip irrigation and high efficiency sprinklers; rational 
pricing and water allocation; crop selectivity and better cultivation practices; more 
accurate weather forecasting linked to water distribution; recycling of urban water 
for irrigation use. Further advances in biogenetics could create food crop varieties 
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that are resistant to drought, salts, and pests.  Desalinization of seawater might 
provide additional supplies if problems of cost, energy, and transport can be 
solved.  
 
If population growth could be slowed to the low variant path of the UN estimates 
(with only one billion additional people), than the task of marshalling water 
resources to meet rising demands while preserving ecosystems would be 
considerably more manageable. But clouding the future of water supply is the „wild 
card“ of climate change, which itself will be influenced by population. Potential 
climate change can greatly complicate issues of planning, timing, and location of 
long-term investments in water management. 
V. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Sophisticated models based on paleological evidence, and on theories of 
physical, chemical, and biological interactions, predict that continued unchecked 
emissions of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sources (chiefly carbon 
dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and destruction of forests, but also methane 
and other gases) could precipitate a change in the climate that has accompanied 
the history of human habitation. In actuality, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere have increased by about a third since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, and (like population numbers) they are moving up into uncharted 
territory. There is high scientific consensus that this growth cannot continue 
indefinitely without throwing the Earth’s climate out of equilibrium. (Benedick 1997; 
2000) 
 
Still, great uncertainties surround the issue of climate change. Since there is no 
prior experience with this phenomenon, the prospective consequences are largely 
conjectural. There is no definite indication as to what level of concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere could prove dangerous, nor how severe the 
possible impacts might be in different regions of the Earth.  
 
For example, intensified hurricanes and storms are expected, and rainfall and 
monsoon patterns will almost surely shift. In some regions there could be more 
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rainfall, in others less. Presently unproductive areas (e.g., Siberia) might become 
more suitable for agriculture. Elsewhere, there could be flooding, erosion, drought, 
the spread of arid lands. Rivers might change their courses. More carbon dioxide 
could prove conducive to higher crop yields and the expansion of agriculture. On 
the other hand, there might be an increase in weeds, disease and pests. Higher 
sea levels and resultant salinization of coastal farmlands and ecosystems are 
among the most probable consequences. For all of these possible impacts, 
however, the extent and timing are still unclear.  
 
The continuing growth in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions might be 
mitigated to some degree by offsetting natural forces such as greater carbon 
absorption in the oceans or increasing cloud cover. But because the gases have 
rather long atmospheric lifetimes, any major change in the great planetary forces 
that determine long-term climate – stratospheric windstreams, ocean currents, 
polar ice cover, the hydrological cycle – could have portentous and potentially 
irreversible results. Crossing an invisible and unpredictable threshold would be 
dangerous. 
 
The links between population and climate change are subtle. Historically, most 
carbon dioxide emissions stem from the economic expansion of the industrialized 
nations of the North, fueled largely by energy from coal and oil. These nations have 
relatively small populations and, at present, virtually no population growth; but they 
also have very high per capita emissions. However, climate change is decidedly 
not – as an Indian diplomat once remarked to me in the context of the ozone 
negotiations -- “rich man’s problem: rich man’s solution.” 
 
Demographic trends in the developing world can affect greenhouse gas 
emissions in several ways. More energy will be consumed by large and growing 
populations to enhance their standard of living; even now, two billion people in the 
South are yet to be supplied with electricity, quite apart from the greater numbers 
that lie ahead. Unprecedented urbanization, combined with an aging population 
(more households) will further contribute to higher per capita energy consumption. 
Intensive industrialization in the currently less developed nations will also add to 
total energy demand. Carbon dioxide emissions could rise as additional land is 
cleared for agriculture and fuelwood, and more methane may be released from 




It is true that per capita emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion in 
the currently less developed nations in the South average only about one-fifth that 
of the industrialized countries in the North. However, emissions of total 
greenhouse gases from the South is augmented by the massive clearing of forests 
and savannas to acquire ever more firewood and land for crops and settlements, a 
factor as yet difficult to measure but nevertheless significant; some estimates 
place them at about one fourth of all anthropogenic emissions. (Gardner-Outlaw 
and Engelman 1999:23). Moreover, developing countries’ understandable priority 
for economic growth means that their future per capita emissions will increase 
even as their population growth begins to taper off. (Meyerson 1998) 
 
In fact, developing nations’ emissions are rapidly approaching and finally 
overtaking those of the North. Even considering only carbon dioxide emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion (and ignoring those from deforestation and biomass 
burning), the South’s portion of the global total has jumped from 29 percent in 
1985 to 42 percent in 1997. China’s CO2 emissions are already second only to 
the United States, and the ground under 1.3 billion Chinese contains one third of 
the world’s known coal reserves. India’s emissions have surged nearly 50 percent 
since 1990 and are now higher than Germany’s. South Korea has surpassed Italy, 
and Mexico’s emissions are almost as large as those of France. (CDIAC 1999) 
Propelled by rapid population growth and expanding industrialization, the South’s 
emissions will probably exceed those of the North in two to three decades. 
 
Unfortunately, efforts under the United Nations to curb rising global emissions of 
greenhouse gases have met with little success to date. Beginning at Chantilly, 
Virginia, in early 1991, 180 nations have been negotiating in vain to establish a 
realistic approach to the problem of climate change. The UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was signed in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and 
entered into force 2½ years later. This was followed by the Kyoto Protocol, agreed 
in Japan in December 1997. The protocol has, however, thus far (December 
1999) been ratified by only 19 small developing countries and none of the major 
emitters. Its prospects for entering into force are questionable given continuing 
deep differences among the negotiating parties on the modalities for achieving 
emissions reductions. (Benedick 2000) 
 
During the negotiations for both of these treaties, population was an unwelcome 
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guest: there was no overt discussion of the linkages. Because of the inability of 
industrialized countries to undertake effective steps to cut emissions, key 
developing nations have refused to even consider commitments to rein in their 
own rapidly rising emissions. Unfortunately, the populations of the South, most 
already living in ecologically fragile areas, are also the most vulnerable to possible 
impacts of climate change, especially altered monsoon patterns, flooding, drought, 
aridity, sea-level rise, and severe storms. 
 
Climate change and population growth share the characteristic of being long-term 
in their effects.  Halting population growth will not by itself prevent climate change.  
Especially in the near term, a slower rise in population will barely affect total 
emissions, which will be largely influenced by the nature of industrialization, energy 
use, and consumption patterns. Still less will it affect the level of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations during the coming century, as it is mainly a product 
of previous emissions of the long-lived gases. 
However, in the longer term the effects of slowing population growth – and of an 
earlier stabilization of global population – would cumulate and significantly 
improve the chances of mitigating climate change. The further into the future one 
looks, the greater could the difference between smaller (low variant) and larger 
(high variant) population size make in the ability of growing economies to achieve 
the substantial future cutbacks in carbon dioxide emissions that are necessary in 
order to avoid dangerous levels of atmospheric concentrations. Slower population 
growth would also relieve pressures on fragile ecosystems – fresh water, forests, 
watersheds, arid regions –and thus improve the chances for adaptation to long-
term climate changes. (Meyerson 1998; Bongaarts et al. 1997; O’Neill et al. 1998) 
VI. CONTAINING POPULATION GROWTH: THE CAIRO SOLUTION 
H.L. Mencken, the satirical American social commentator of the 1930s, has been 
quoted as stating that for every difficult problem, there is a simple solution – and 
it’s usually wrong. The phenomenon of population growth, as we have witnessed it 
in the twentieth century, is surely one of the most difficult and complex of problems. 
 
Birth rates in most countries of the South have begun to decline during the past 
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decade. But, in the face of the United Nations’ medium variant projection for 2050, 
the “most likely” outcome, are they coming down rapidly enough? Nearly nine 
billion people in the next fifty years – and still rising, possibly to 11 or 12 billion? Is 
this desirable? Inevitable? 
 
Can we lower birth rates sufficiently to achieve the 7.3 billion low variant – which, 
incidentally, would imply a future stabilization of global population at somewhat 
below this level, just a billion or so more than at present? Is “development the best 
contraceptive,” as propagandists for the South trumpeted for many years as an 
argument for more, and ever more, foreign aid? Will the free market and less 
government interference provide the solution? Is “democratization” the key? Is it 
simply a matter of inundating the South with condoms and contraceptive pills? 
 
As the experience of population programs over the last thirty years has 
demonstrated, there are no simple answers. We will have to do many things 
simultaneously.  
 
At Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
culminated over two years of negotiations on an agenda for the future. Among the 
many important documents, resolutions, declarations and aspirations at this 
monumental conference, one historic feature stands out.  The leaders of nearly all 
the world’s nations established for the first time the political legitimacy of the 
concept of sustainable development: to conserve and manage the planet’s 
resources in a manner that can improve the conditions of today’s populations 
without foreclosing options for the well-being of the generations still to come.  
A logical follow-up to the rather profound and many-faceted implications of the Rio 
conference was the convening in Cairo two years later of the 1994 International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). Again following two years of 
preparatory negotiations, the world’s governments at Cairo affirmed that early 
stabilization of the Earth’s human population would be crucial for attaining 
sustainable development. In particular, they agreed on a “Cairo Programme of 
Action.” (Ashford 1995; UNFPA 1999) 
 
This carefully negotiated document, a twenty-year program to the year 2015, was 
both more specific and more practical than the voluminous 800-page “Agenda 21” 
that was adopted at Rio to encourage long-term actions to promote sustainable 
development. Under the Cairo Programme, governments accepted specific 
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quantitative and qualitative twenty-year targets which, if achieved, might enable the 
world to achieve population stabilization at just over 7 billion, rather than facing in 
mid-century a still-growing population of 9 billion or even 11 billion.  
 
The ICPD deliberations were influenced by three decades of international 
experience that clearly demonstrated that family planning programs could succeed 
in countries widely differing in their cultures, political and economic systems, and 
levels of development -- from Cuba to Tunisia, from Iran to Viet Nam, from 
Thailand to Brazil. The key to significant lowering of birth rates was the presence 
of certain enabling conditions: when girls and women enjoyed decent health care 
and access to family planning methods and advice; when most girls received at 
least primary education; when women had better economic opportunities and 
social status; when infant mortality was low; when adolescent child-bearing 
declined, marriage was delayed to a later age, and births were spaced more 
widely. Each of these factors reinforces the others, in a cumulative effect. Perhaps 
most important, experience worldwide showed that most women, if given the 
choice and the means, would have fewer children than their mothers did.  
 
For over twenty years, since the first world conference on population in 1974 in 
Bucharest, governments had largely paid lip service (and then only after strenuous 
negotiations) to the concept that all couples and individuals have a basic right to 
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children – 
and to have the information, education, and means to do so.  
 
But despite two decades of noble rhetoric, the realities were different as the 
century drew to a close. About one third of women of reproductive age in 
developing nations – approximately 350 million – have no access to family 
planning information and services.  Existing health programs were strained to 
meet the needs of the increasing numbers of women entering their reproductive 
years. There are approximately one billion adolescents – more than ever before in 
history – who, largely because of religious and cultural mores, are hypocritically 
kept uneducated about these subjects, even though most are sexually active; thus, 
they are particularly susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted 
early pregnancies, which are inimical to the health of both the young mothers and 
their infants. And, finally, in most countries social equity for women remains a cruel 




Against this background, high-level representatives of 179 governments at Cairo, 
under the sensitive leadership of the conference secretary general, Dr. Nafis 
Sadik, Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund, agreed on 
several quantitative targets to be achieved in the ensuing two decades (UNFPA 
1999): 
 
universal access by 2015 to the full range of “reproductive health” services, 
covering family planning, maternal health, and prevention and treatment of 
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS; 
universal primary education by 2015 for all girls and boys; 
specified, significant reductions by 2015 in mortality rates for infants, for 
children, and for mothers; and 
financial targets, of which more below. 
 
In addition, the „Cairo Programme of Action“ iterated qualitative goals, or 
aspirations, which were just as carefully negotiated as the quantitative targets. 
These included: increased access by young women to higher education (beyond 
primary school); greater attention to adolescents’ reproductive health needs; 
elimination of violence against women; and broad-based measures to ensure 
gender equity and equality, and the empowerment of women in the job market and 
in the development process. 
 
The ICPD did not adopt or recommend demographic targets, such as specific 
reductions in birth rates or family size, since experience in some countries, notably 
India and China, had shown that such targets could lead to human rights abuses 
by overzealous administrators. Instead, a consistent theme throughout the „Cairo 
Programme of Action“ was the emphasis on personal choice and on the quality of 
reproductive health/family planning services.  
 
Underlying the ICPD approach is the assumption that creating suitable conditions 
will lead women – and their menfolk – to make the “right” choices in terms of birth 
spacing and family size.  As discussed above, experience has showed that birth 
rates can indeed decline under certain circumstances.  What remains an open 
question after Cairo, however, is whether they can fall fast enough and far enough 
to make a difference, or whether the total fertility rate might stall at 3 or even 2½ 
children per woman. Were this to occur at anything above a TFR of 2.1 (the 
  22
“replacement level of fertility”), population numbers would continue to climb to new 
heights, albeit more slowly. 
 
Unfortunately, follow-up negotiations during 1999 to evaluate progress under the 
program revealed backsliding by some governments and sadly familiar 
controversies over issues of cultural and religious sensitivity, ranging from 
acknowledgment of adolescent sexuality and ensuring safe abortion (where legal) 
to the status and rights of women in general. Five years after Cairo, the trends 
were not encouraging: continued discrimination and violence against girls and 
women; hundreds of millions of couples still lacking access to family planning 
services; HIV/AIDS spreading more rapidly than anticipated; tens of thousands of 
women still dying due to unsafe abortions; and only limited progress in reducing 
infant, child, and maternal mortality. (UNFPA 1999) 
 
Equally discouraging was the failure of governments to come up with the financial 
resources that had been estimated at Cairo as essential to implement the 
program. The ICPD, after hard negotiation, had calculated that a total of $17.5 
billion would be required by the year 2000, and $21.7 billion by 2015, to achieve 
the quantitative targets enumerated above. It was agreed that two thirds of these 
amounts would be raised by the developing countries themselves, while the donor 
community would furnish the remaining one third.  
 
 
The latest available data, however, revealed that the foreign donors in particular 
were far behind the needed pace. In 1997, only $1.7 billion had been raised, 
making it highly unlikely that the donors would reach their $5.7 billion target for 
2000. (UNFPA 1999)  With the exception of a handful of nations (Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), aid-malaise appears to have taken its toll 
on the health, education, and women’s programs recommended by ICPD. To 
place the sums in perspective, the $17.5 billion global target for 2000 amounts to 
less than one week of the world’s expenditures on armaments. (UNFPA 1997) 
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VIII. CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTIES AHEAD 
It is clear that in the course of the new century the human population will move into 
a zone – 8 to 12 billion – which many analysts have predicted could exceed the 
Earth’s supportive capacity. (Cohen 1995) The difference between the 7.3 billion 
United Nations low variant and the 10.7 billion high variant for 2050 is equivalent to 
the total population of the world as recently as 1966. That is quite a difference. 
 
There is no question that improving standards of living for the current poor of the 
world, plus providing for the billions still to come, will increase global demand for 
food, water, energy, wood, housing, sanitation, disposal of wastes. Even if the 
interrelationships between population and the ecological support systems of the 
planet are not yet established with statistical certainty, it behooves us to act with 
prudence, to err on the side of caution in both our population and our 
environmental policies. 
 
Investments in measures to slow the rate of population growth – and thereby to 
reach a stable population earlier, and at lower levels, than under current trends – 
would significantly reinforce efforts to address the environmental challenges of the 
century ahead, and considerably lower the cost of such efforts. We need to 
proceed on several fronts simultaneously: 
 
 
achieving the health, education, and gender equity goals of the „Cairo 
Programme of Action“; 
reducing wasteful life-styles and consumption; 
investing in technology to facilitate new energy forms and less resource-
intensive industrial and agricultural production; 
adapting our political and economic institutions to the future, making them more 
responsive, humane, and more focused on the long-term perspective rather than 
on tomorrow’s stock market results or next year’s elections. 
 
Seven years ago, the officers of 58 national academies of science met at a 
worldwide “Science Summit” in New Delhi. They issued a warning that is relevant 
to our current concerns. The scientific leaders  
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...  expressed a sense of urgent concern about the expansion of the 
world’s population and concluded that if current predictions of population 
growth prove accurate and patterns of human activity on the planet remain 
unchanged, science and technology may not be able to prevent irreversible 
degradation of the natural environment and continued poverty for much of 
the world. ...   
The academies believe that ultimate success in dealing with global social, 
economic, and environmental problems cannot be achieved without a 
stable world population.  The goal should be to reach zero population 
growth within the lifetime of our children. (National Academy of Sciences 
1993) 
 
The stable population goal of the national academies is equivalent to the UN low 
variant  estimate for 2050, which is also the objective of the “Cairo Programme of 
Action”. We are clearly not on that path. 
 
The interactions between human activities and the Earth’s natural systems in the 
century ahead will determine the future of our species.  It is not merely a technical 
problem of feeding the teeming billions. We must define our vision of the future: an 
Earth of humans and wheat (or edible seaweed)?  Without the wilderness, without 
the great animals?  
 
Decisions made now will be critical. The central issue is the quality of life: how 
men and women of the future will be able to live, their options and their trade-offs. 
Will it be a life of dignity and security and beauty? 
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